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INTRODUCTION

The first U.S. statewide teachers' strike happened in 1968.
Thousands of teachers walked off the job, in some cases closing schools
for months. This display of civil disobedience did not happen in a
bedrock union state like Illinois or Michigan. It happened in Florida.'
Facing overcrowded schools, teachers demanded more money for
public education. In 1967, Governor Claude Kirk vetoed a property tax
hike aimed at providing more funds to public schools, despite
campaigning heavily on a platform to improve them. Outraged, more
*

Suzanne Tzuanos is a former Managing Editor of the University of FloridaJournalof
Law and Public Policy at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. She is currently a
union-side labor and workers' rights attorney in Orlando at the firm of Egan, Lev & Siwica,
P.A. She thanks her husband, Justin, for his loving encouragement and support.
1. Year In Review, UPI (1968), at http://www.upi.com/Audio/Year inReview/Eventsof-1968/Pope-Paul-VI/Garbage-Strike/i 2303153093431-7/.
2. William F. McHugh, The Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective
295

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAWAND PUBLIC POLICY

296

[Vol. 24

than 40% of Florida teachers walked out. Schools closed, teachers
forwent salaries children stayed at home, and Florida's governor
became enraged.
In the end, the strike mostly achieved the teachers' goals. As a
consequence of their actions, they secured a rapid increase in education
4
funding to meet the needs of the children in their care.
The teachers were hardly alone. From 1960 to 1969 more than 25
groups of Florida employees participated in labor strikes.5 During this
tumultuous time, workers in Florida had no guaranteed collective
bargaining rights.6 That soon changed.
In 1968, Floridians approved a new state Constitution. In it were
provisions guaranteeing the right of all employees to organize into
unions, or not, and to collectively bargain and enter into contracts.
Today, Floridians still enjoy a Constitutional right to bargain with
their employers over issues concerning wages, hours and working
conditions. However, the current rights of public employees to
collectively bargain have become a sham. Legislation currently renders
public employees' bargaining positions moot and their labor contracts
illusory.
This Note demonstrates how the Florida Legislature's bias against
public-sector collectively bargained contracts amounts to an improper
intrusion of public law into what is a constitutionally supported private
law matter between workers and their employers. It opens (Part I) with
background into the Florida Constitution's unique provision
guaranteeing private-sector collective bargaining rights. Part II explores
Bargaining,1974-1978: Bellwetherfor the South, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 263, 264 (1978).
3. Public Schools: Walkout in Florida, TIME (Mar. 1, 1968), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941242,00.html.
4. Id.
5. Teacher Strike Changed Labor in Florida, WJHG (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:40 PM),
http://www.wjhg.com/news/headlines/Teacher-Strike-Changed-Labor-in-Florida--170236516.
html ("The leader of the [teacher's] strike was fined thirty thousand dollars and sentenced to two
years in prison, but the jail time was later waived.").
6. Raymond G. McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Florida-Past,
Present and Future, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 26, 34 (1973).
Prior to 1943, both the Florida Statutes and the Constitution of 1885 were silent
on the right of public employees to bargain collectively or to strike against their
employers. As a common law state, however, Florida presumably followed the
traditional rule that in the absence of direct legislative mandate, public
employers had no obligation to bargain with the collective bargaining
representative of their employees.
Id.
7.

8.

See FLA. CONST. art. I
Id.

§§ 6, 10.
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how, in spite of that guarantee, public employees spanning the state
from Miami 9 to "the happiest place on Earth" (Walt Disney World's
Reedy Creek Improvement District)1o are repeatedly denied a
meaningful right to bargain with their employers. Part III examines the
private law and public law tension within collective bargaining law.
Finally, Part IV concludes that collectively bargained contracts between
public employees and their employers are private law matters and must
be protected from an improper public law intrusion into the fundamental
bargaining rights of Floridians.
I. THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN IN FLORIDA

The Florida Constitution provides for both a general right to enter
into and enforce contracts, and a specific right for employees to enter
into collectively bargained contracts with their employers."' Collective
bargaining agreements are binding, enforceable contracts.1 2 The Florida
Constitution itself reads: "The right of employees, by and through a
labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or
abridged." 3
The term "employees," as used in the Florida Constitution, "applies
in its broadest sense to include all Florida employees, public and
private."l 4 All employees are, on the face of Article I, Section 6, equally
entitled to collectively bargain with their employers as their private
counterparts.15
Article I, Section 6, holds a vaunted placement in the Florida
Constitution in the Declaration of Rights, among other fundamental
rights like religious freedom' 6 and the right to bear arms. 17 Yet unlike
other fundamental rights, it is not self-effectuating. In fact, the Florida
Legislature did not create a statute to enforce the right to collectively
bargain until a 1972 mandate from the Florida Supreme Court. 18 Even
9. See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
11. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993) (The right to
contract is expressly guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution and is equally
enforceable in labor contracts by operation of article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution).
12. Id. ("The right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our
fundamental law .

. .

. The legislature has only a very severely limited authority to change the

law to eliminate a contractual obligation it has itself created.").
13. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
14. Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla.
2003).
15. Id.
16. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
17. Id. § 8.
18. Dade Cnty. Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla.
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that was not enough for the right to be fully respected. From 1991-1998,
Governor Lawton Chiles and his cabinet litigated numerous, lengthy
court battles over the right to bargain.' 9
Despite legislative and executive pushback, the judicial branch has
been the lone defender of this battered Constitutional right. It
consistently holds that the Florida Legislature cannot abridge public
employees' right to bargain collectively absent a compelling state
interest making it necessary to do so. 20 Unfortunately for public
employees, the judiciary has not yet had the opportunity to adequately
address the current Florida laws that impermissibly impede upon their
right to bargain. However, that opportunity may soon be on the
horizon.

II. PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES ARE DENIED A MEANINGFUL RIGHT TO
BARGAIN UNDER CURRENT FLORIDA LAW

"With the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the
same rights of collective bargaining as are granted private employees by
Section 6."22 Litigants, judges, special magistrates and arbitrators
repeat this phrase so often that it is almost mantric.2 And yet, public
1972).
The legislature, having thus entered the field, we have confidence that within a
reasonable time it will extend its time and study into this field and therefore,
judicial implementation of the rights in question would be premature at this
time. If not, this Court will, in an appropriate case, have no choice but to
fashion such guidelines by judicial decree in such manner as may seem to the
Court best adapted to meet the requirements of the constitution, and comply
with our responsibility."). does not within reasonable time extend its time and
study into field of regulating right of collective bargaining by public employees
as guaranteed by State Constitution, Supreme Court will, in an appropriate
case, have no choice but to fashion guidelines by judicial decree in such
manner as may seem to the Court best adapted to meet requirements of the
Constitution.
Id.
19. See generally State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992);
Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 671; and Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla.
1999).
20. See CoastalFla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 838 So. 2d at 548 ("This Court has deemed
the right to collective bargaining to be of a fundamental character and has applied a strict
scrutiny test to any action which tends to undermine this right."); Dade Cnty. Sch. Adm'rs
Ass'n, Local 77 v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 840 So. 2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
22. Dade Cnty. Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969).
23. See City of Tallahassee v. Pub. Emp. Relations Comm'n, 410 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla.
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employees are subject to legal restrictions on their contracting rights
that private employees are not. In particular, two laws single out and
unconstitutionally nullify the collective bargaininf rights of public
employees: Florida's Financial Urgency Statute 2 and its Impasse
Resolution Statute. 25 As applied, these laws allow public employers to
undermine, if not eliminate, good faith bargaining.
A. Florida'sFinancialUrgency Law
"[TThere can be no doubt that common sense does generally find
something revolting about the breakingof a promise."
Morris Cohen (1933).26
Florida Statute § 447.4095 (1997) ostensibly allows a public
employer to modify labor contracts in the event of a bona fide financial
emergency. However, Florida's Public Employee Relation's Committee
(PERC) has recently rendered all collectively bargained contracts nonbinding and illusory, through a dubious interpretation of that law which
allows employers to void contracts without being subject to strict
scrutiny, as required.
Because the right to bargain collectively is a fundamental
constitutional right, any attempts to abridge it should be subject to strict
27
scrutiny. Yet, in 2009, PERC read the statute to allow a state employer
to simply declare a "financial urgency" without being subjected to any
scrutiny and then unilaterally change the terms of a valid contract over
1981); United Teachers of Dade, FEA/United AFT, Local 1974 v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 500 So.
2d 508, 510 (Fla. 1986); Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1998) aff'd, 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999); State Emps. Attorneys Guild v. State, 653 So. 2d
487, 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Lakeland Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2350, 1975 WL 42142, *5
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. 1975).
24.

FLA. STAT.

§ 447.4095

(1997):

In the event of a financial urgency requiring modification of an agreement, the
chief executive officer or his or her representative and the bargaining agent or
its representative shall meet as soon as possible to negotiate the impact of the
financial urgency. If after a reasonable period of negotiation which shall not
exceed 14 days, a dispute exists between the public employer and the
bargaining agent, an impasse shall be deemed to have occurred, and one of the
parties shall so declare in writing to the other party and to the commission. The
parties shall then proceed pursuant to the provisions of s. 447.403. An unfair
labor practice charge shall not be filed during the 14 days during which
negotiations are occurring pursuant to this section.

§ 447.403

25.

FLA. STAT.

26.
27.

Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 572 (1933).
See supra text accompanying note 18.

(2004).
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the objection of workers.28
Currently, a public employer needs nothing but its word to declare a
"financial urgency" and invoke the contract-killing provisions of the
statute. PERC was able to form this lax interpretation because the
statute itself gives no hints as to what a "financial urgency" actually is,
or when a municipality would be justified in declaring one.
"Financial urgency" is a term that appears nowhere else in Florida
law.29 Two terms come close to providing clues to what legislators may
have meant when they used the term: "financial emergency" and
"financial exigency."
The term "financial emergency" is found in Florida Statute §§
218.50-504 dealing with charter school agreements and local
governments. 30 There, the use of a "financial emergency" is subject to
very specific criteria. A "financial emergency" may only be declared in
situations when a public entity proves that it does not have sufficient
unreserved funds to meet its obligations. Further, even if properly
declared, a "financial emergency" does not allow an entity to void its
contractual obligations. 3 1
Another term that may inform the mystery of "financial urgency" is
"financial exigency" (found in PERC case law).3 2 A "financial
exigency" applies when an employer is forced by an emergency (such
as a public safety or weather event) to take immediate action regarding
public workers' wages, hours or working conditions. 33 Presumably, this
28. See Manatee Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 35 F.P.E.R. 46, at 89
(2009) (holding that a public employer is not required to demonstrate a compelling state interest
or the absence of viable alternatives before invoking the financial urgency statute).
29. Jennifer L. Rosinski, Labor Relations in Florida'sPublic Sector: Visiting the State's
Past and Present to Finda Future Solution to the Fight Over the Public Purse Under Florida's
FinancialUrgency Statute, 35 NOVA L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
Passed in 1995, the law seemingly allows a public employer to avoid its
collective bargaining responsibility and abridge the collective bargaining
contract in cases of "financial urgency." But despite the legislature's good
intentions when crafting the statute, its language poses more questions than
answers. Even now, fifteen years after its enactment, the statute remains a
mystery.
Id.
30. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 218.50-504.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 218.503(3)(h) (declaring financial emergency may require a plan by
the entity's officials to provide for "payment in full" of any outstanding contractual obligations).
32. See Pensacola Junior Coll. Faculty Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Pensacola Junior Coll., 13
F.P.E.R. 18150 (1987).
33. See Pasco Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 108, 125
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (citing NLRB v. Minute Maid Corp., 283 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1960)); see
also Sch. Bd. of Indian River Cnty. v. Indian River Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, Local 3617, 373 So. 2d
412, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (showing where management had to take immediate action
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is because in an exigency, there is no time to return to the bargaining
table to discuss the impact of the exigency on workers.34 However, case
law informs us that an "exigency" is likely a situation more severe than
an "urgency."35
Because PERC has found that a "financial urgency" is neither a
"financial emergency" nor a "financial exigency," it becomes nearly
impossible to discern when a public employer truly cannot pay on its
bargained agreements, and when it is attempting to shirk them for
political purposes.36 When municipalities have no clear standards to
adhere to before voiding a contract, their contracts cease to be
enforceable and become merely illusory. 37 Two recent declarations by
Florida cities illustrate this point: Miami and Hollywood.
Blaming growing pension costs for a $100 million budget deficit in
2011, Miami city leaders threatened layoffs for more than one-thousand
employees. 38 The city's desperation to avoid paying bargained-for
pension costs led it to invoke a "financial urgency."39 PERC allowed
Miami to unilaterally change the terms of the contract with its
employees based on an unverified assertion of inability to pay and
without returning to the bargaining process to remedy the problem. 4 0
without returning to the bargaining table, such as in the case of a citrus crop freeze).
34. PensacolaJuniorColl. FacultyAss'n, 13 F.P.E.R. 18150 (1987).
35. Compare Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993) (holding
that a financial emergency cannot be declared unless "no other reasonable alternative means of
preserving its contract" exists), with Manatee Educ. Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty., 35
F.P.E.R. 46, 89 (2009) (holding that a public employer is not required to demonstrate a
compelling state interest or the absence of viable alternatives before invoking the financial
urgency statute).
36. Rosinski, supra note 29, at 228.
In public sector bargaining it is often hard to distinguish between an employer's
contended inability to fund a collective bargaining agreement with its
unwillingness to pay. Undoubtedly governments do experience periods of fiscal
concern, but claiming "inability to pay" as frequently as they do renders those
claims about as effective as "crying wolf." The notion of underfunding a
bargained-for labor agreement in the public sector is not simply a problem of
economics; rather, such a decision is driven largely by political pressures
inherent to the public domain. It is that political feature that distinguishes
collective bargaining in the public sector from that in the private.
Id.
37. See Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1270
(Fla. 2008) ("[A] contract that is not mutually enforceable is illusory."). See also 11 Fla. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 94.
38. Charles Rabin, Miami Commission Focuses on Averting Budget Calamity, MIAMI
HERALD, June 11, 2010, at Bl.
39. Id.
40. Rosinski, supra note 29, at 230.
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The bargained-for agreement that city leaders made with their
employees was unenforceable. It was illusory.
On August 1, 2012, the city of Hollywood Fire Fighter's Union
(IAFF Local 1375) filed an unfair labor practice with PERC. The
Hollywood Fire Fighters charged that the city unlawfully declared a
"financial urgency." 4 The final order by PERC absolved the city of
Hollywood of any duty to prove that modifying the parties' contract was
the least restrictive means to address its "urgency." In doing so, PERC
sidestepped the employees' constitutional right to bargain and the city's
duty to withstand strict scrutiny of its decisions when they affect their
workers' fundamental right to bargain. 42
The absurdity of the "financial urgency" statute is simply illustrated.
A municipality cannot declare such a financial urgency and then
selectively void or unilaterally impose new terms on its agreements with
its bank, utility provider, or even individual employment contracts. The
statute singles out only collectively bargained agreements for avoidance
by employers and allows employers to renege on their contracts without
passing strict scrutiny as mandated by law.
Florida legislators technically took a neutral stance on unionization
when drafting Florida Statute § 447.44 However, the financial urgency
statute certainly discourages organization by making collectivelybargained contracts illusory and non-binding while other contracts,
including individual employment contracts, enjoy full legal enforcement
by the courts.
A federal court recently enjoined a New York county ordinance
similar to Florida's law,4 noting that the "[union] can no longer
represent [its] members in any meaningful way, now that any negotiated
provision they have endeavored to secure in the past can instantly be
reduced to a nullity." 46 While the final disposition on the ordinance has
41. Hollywood Fire Fighters v. City of Hollywood, Petitioner's Statement of the Case (on
file with author).
42. Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993) ("Before legislature
can reduce previously approved appropriations for increase in public workers' salaries pursuant
to collective bargaining agreement, legislature must demonstrate that funds are available from
no other possible reasonable source; political expediency is not compelling reason.").
43. See Dade Cnty. Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla.
1972).
44. FLA. STAT. § 447.201 ("Nothing [in the Act] shall be construed either to encourage or
discourage organization of public employees.").
45. On June 18, 2012, the Nassau County Executive Manager signed into law LL 315-12.
LL 315-12 allows the County to unilaterally (1) "relieve from duty any duty employees
represented by a collective bargaining unit for one day per week"; (2) "modify any County
contracts"; (3) "freeze base and supplemental wages for County employees"; and (4) "reduce or
eliminate employer contribution to employee benefits." LL 315-12, § 2(A)(1), (3)-(5).
46. Donohue v. Mangano, 886 F. Supp. 2d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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not yet been determined by the courts, the enjoining court was quite
clear in its analysis that the state law was likely a violation of the U.S.
constitutional right to contract. Because the U.S. Constitution does not
guarantee collective bargaining rights and the Florida Constitution does,
it stands to reason that a law that violates the U.S. Constitution's
Contracts Clause would clearly be violative of the Florida
Constitution's Article I, Section 6.
It is not to say that a city, county, or state organization could not,
under any circumstance, seek to change a contract due to a financial
crisis. In fact, the Legislature has affirmative authority to "reduce
previously approved appropriations to pay public workers' salaries
made pursuant to collective bargaining agreement[s], but only where it
can demonstrate compelling state interest; [the] legislature must be
given some leeway to deal with bonafide emergencies."4 7
There are frameworks available for adoption under both the
Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that
balance the right to bargain with management rights in an emergency.
The NLRA excuses non-compliance with a collectively-bargained
contract due to financial exigency.48 However under the NLRA, an
employer is not permitted to unilaterally ignore selected provisions of a
contract mid-term. 49 Similarly, a private sector employer cannot fail to
perform on a contract mid-term unless it has declared bankruptcy.50
Even then, the employer must petition the bankruptcy court for
permission to revoke or avoid an agreement and then return to the
bargaining table to attempt to negotiate new terms of employment.
B. Florida'sImpasse Resolution Scheme
The second law differentiating the collective bargaining rights of
public employees from private employees is the Impasse Resolution
47. Chiles, 615 So. 2d at 673 (emphasis added).
48. RBE Elecs. of S.D., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1995).
The Board has similarly held that under exigent circumstances an employer
need not give notice and bargain concerning the effects of closing its
operations, but has limited its definition of such exigent circumstances to
situations such as where an employer lacked funds to continue operating and
paying employees, or lost performance bonds required by law and had the bank
end the employer's line of credit.
Id. n.10 (citing Your Host, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 295, 297 (1994); Compu-Net Commc'ns, Inc.,
315 N.L.R.B. 216, 223 (1994)).
49. RBEElecs. ofS.D., 320 N.L.R.B. 80, 81.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
5 1. Id.
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scheme of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. When the parties at the
negotiating table cannot reach an agreement on a mandatory subject of
bargaining 2 after a reasonable period of time, either may declare an
impasse under Chapter 447. The parties may use mediation as a firststep, but many proceed directly to a fact-finding arbitration. At
arbitration, a special magistrate holds hearings, determines facts and
makes a decision on the unresolved issues. 53 The arbitrator's decision is
guided by objective standards laid out in Chapter 447.54 However, this
is not the end of things. The arbitrator's decision is not binding. It is
merely a suggestion to be disregarded at the next step.
The true final decision-maker over the issues at impasse is the
municipality itself.55 The same party that was once at the bargaining
table is now placed in a position to break the impasse. 6 This process
gives municipalities every incentive to resort to impasse over wages,
hours, and working conditions. The process also renders collective
bargaining, a constitutional right in Florida, a shallow exercise in
"collective begging."
Proponents of Chapter 447 argue that workers and their unions are
participants in the political process, and therefore, the legislative bodies
of municipalities are ultimately responsible to them. Many

52. Like the National Labor Relations Board, Florida courts have found that wages, hours
and working conditions are mandatory subjects of bargaining and are the only subjects that a
party may declare impasse over. City of Orlando v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n, 435 So.
2d 275, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542
(4th Cir. 1967). See also City of New Port Richey v. Hillsborough Cty. Police Benevolent
Ass'n, Inc., 505 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that an issue which has "an impact"
upon terms and conditions of employment must be bargained); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Cent.
Fla. Prof I Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 2057, 467 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (holding that
an issue "affecting, or impacting upon, employment or a condition of employment" must be
bargained).
53.

See FLA. STAT.

§

447.403 (2004).

54. See id. § 447.405 (Entitled "Factors to be Considered by the Special Magistrate").
55. Alaine S. Williams, Alternatives to the Right to Strike for Public Employees: Do They
Adequately Implement Florida'sConstitutionalRight to Collectively Bargain?,7 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 475 (1979) ("The one-sided nature of the Florida collective bargaining process, together
with the prohibition on public employee strikes, leaves little leverage in the hands of the worker
over terms and conditions of employment."). See also McHugh, supra note 2, at 319.
Impartiality is nearly impossible when the school board is both the public
employer (with responsibility for negotiating the contract) and the legislative
body (with ultimate authority for resolving contract disputes). Nothing
undermines the validity of factfinding in the school districts more than the fact
that the school boards wear two hats.
Id.
56. See Williams, supra note 55.
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commentators have noted how useless this "power" is in the South.57
One sums it up thusly: "a local legislator may occasionally regret voting
for a final contract that will disaffect constituents who are public
employees, but in all likelihood the majority of his constituents are
hostile to unions and will support his vote."58
There is one specific place in Florida where political power is even
more of an illusion than in other areas of the state. The Reedy Creek
Improvement District (RCID) is visited by millions of tourists every
year and most do not even know they have been there. They only know
it as Walt Disney World and Disney's various resorts and attractions.
The Florida Legislature created the RCID in 1967 at the behest of Walt
Disney himself.5 9 RCID allowed Disney to build his empire without
interference from local ordinances governing building and financing.
Today, RCID functions like a city. It controls its own planning,
zoning, transportation, fire protection and utility services. o RCID
employs hundreds of public workers. There are two "cities" within
RCID: Bay Lake and Lake Buena Vista. 62 In the latest available census
data, the city of Bay Lake has a population of 47 people. 63 The city of
Lake Buena Vista has an exact population of 10 people. 64 According to
the RCID Comprehensive Plan, its population is fixed and not expected
to grow or shrink considerably through 2020.65 That is because all land
in RCID is owned either by subsidiaries of Walt Disney World or
Disney World executives who are deeded 5-acre lots in order to give
them voting rights within RCID.6 RCID elections are decided by
landowners-1 vote per acre of land owned.6 7 Walt Disney World owns
two-thirds of the land, namely 17,000 acres, which is far more than any

57.
58.

McHugh, supra note 2, at 279.
Williams, supra note 55, at 484.

59.

About, REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, http://www.rcid.org/About.aspx (last

visited Mar. 29, 2013).
60.

Doing Business, REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, http://www.rcid.org/Doing

Business.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. 2010 Population Search, U.S. CENsuS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popfinder/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
64. Id.
65.

Comprehensive Plan 2020, REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT (2012), available

at http://www.rcid.org/Portals/0/Documents/ComprehensivePlan/2020 Comprehensive_Plan.
pdf.
66. Jason Garcia, Disney's Reedy Creek Government Has Rare Board Vacancy, But
Don't Bother Running, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 9, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/
2011-05-09/business/os-disney-reedy-creek-election-20110509_1_disney-awards-reedy-creek-i
mprovement-district-tom-moses.
67. Id.
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other private owner.6 8 Consequently, Walt Disney World is solely
responsible for determining who is elected to RCID executive and
legislative body offices. The legislative body positions are sometimes
even "inherited" within families with deep ties to Disney. 69
Without even the pretense of political power, RCID employees are
wholly stripped of their constitutional right to bargain. Workers have no
voting rights within RCID and have no influence to exert over its
"elected" officials. This problem is not a hypothetical one. In January
2013, the RCID legislative body ("Board") convened to resolve an
impasse between the Reedy Creek Firefighters and RCID negotiators
regarding an insurance plan. 70 The Board sat quietly and listened to
presentations from both Firefighter and RCID negotiators.7 1 Board
members asked few questions and did not engage in a substantive
debate. In the end, all Board members sided with RCID managers. 72
Reedy Creek Firefighters then led an effort in the Florida Legislature
to change Chapter 447 so that an impasse resolution would end with an
arbitrator's binding decision. The process began well for the workers.
Orange County's legislative delegation voted unanimously to send the
idea to Tallahassee and Disney publically maintained neutrality on the
issue. Behind the scenes, it was a different story. The bill died in
committee at the behest of Disney in a shady exercise of back-door
dealings.74
Florida public employees' right to bargain is undermined at both the
bargaining table and once a contract is agreed upon. Florida law
incentivizes municipalities to go to impasse with union officials over
mandatory subjects of bargaining under Chapter 447's impasse scheme
because it allows management itself to be the ultimate decision-maker
of contractual disputes. Once a contract is in place, Florida's financial
urgency statute allows a municipality to void it at any time with little or
no proof that it is unable to pay its debts. These public laws render the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Jason Garcia, Reedy Creek Board Sides with Management in Contract Talks,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 11, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-01-1 1/the-dailydisney/os-reedy-creek-firefighters-20130111_1 reedy-creek-contract-talks-firefighters.
7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. Jason Garcia, Firefighters Seek State Help in Battles with Disney-Controlled
Government, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 25, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-0225/the-daily-disney/os-firefighters-challenge-disney-government-20130222_lreedy-creekfirefighters-walt-disney-world.
74. Jason Garcia, Disney Lobbying Helped Kill Bill Sought by Reedy Creek Firefighters,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 29, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/blogs/
political-pulse/os-disney-world-lobbying-helped-doom-bill-sought-by-reedy-creek-firefighters20130429,0,28825.post.
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rights guaranteed in Section 1, Article 6 of the Florida Constitution
illusory. Further, these public laws intrude into matters that should be
governed principally by private law.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PRIVATE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
THE PUBLIC LAW OF ENFORCING CONTRACTS
Depending on who you ask, contract law may be more about public
law or more about private law.7 But almost everyone seems to agree
that contract law is both private and public in nature. Contract law is
private because contracts are essentially the creation of new rules and
responsibilities between two parties.77
Yet all contracts, even the most private, have public law
consequences. Less savvy or powerful parties may be taken advantage
of in contravention of public policy or the welfare of the state. That is
why statutes and the common law require some kinds of contracts to
adhere to formalities designed to protect both private and public
interests.79 In the 1930s, federal and state statutes regarding labor
contracts were deemed necessary to require employers to go to the
bargaining table and quiet industrial strife.80 Regarding public employee
labor rights, not very many people would dispute that it is a good idea to
prohibit striking by essential public safety personnel like firefighters
and police officers.
Yet, the main purpose of a labor contract is most correctly seen as
one primarily interested in private law issues because the purpose of a
labor contract is to govern the employee-employer relationship." While
75. Compare Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv.
L. REv. 999, 1007-08, 1021, 1024 (1955) (characterizing the main focus and purpose of
collectively bargained contracts as private law), with Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601, 636 (1956) (focusing on the public policy and needs of a
labor agreement). See also Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 341
(2009) (discussing the evolution of the private law theory within contract theory).
76. See Shulman, supra note 75.
77. Id. at 1007-08.
78. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contracts,46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 586 (1933) ("[Tlhe
law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according
to which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the parties to a more or
less voluntary transaction.").
79. Examples of such formalities would be the statute of frauds, the parole evidence rule,
and the prohibition of enforcing contracts against children except for food or shelter. See U.C.C.
art. 1.
80. The National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935. NationalLabor Relations Act,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act

(last

visited Apr. 9, 2013).
81. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CAL.
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a measure of public law is necessary to enforce private law contracts,82
too much public interference into contract law detracts83 from its
essential purpose: to allow parties the freedom to bargain and make
enforceable promises.84 The only public law necessary in labor
contracts is the sort that gets the parties to the table on relatively equal
grounds and keeps them there until they hash out an agreement that they
can both agree to.8 5
IV. PUBLIC LAW INTERFERENCE IN LABOR LAW CONTRACTS
SHOULD BE LIMITED
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
L. REV. 663, 721 (1973).
There can be no doubt that a desire for higher economic rewards is often the
generating force leading to collective bargaining. The promise of higher wages
and improved benefits was, and probably still is, one of the prime attractions
offered by the union organizer. But it is equally true that one of the objectives
of collective bargaining, and I would argue its larger significance, is the
creation of a system of private law to govern the employer-employee
relationship.
Id.
82. Cox, supra note 75, at 605.
Labor, management, and arbitrators must recognize that the ideals and needs of
society limit their freedom of decision ... [but, tihe principles determining
legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining agreement should not be
imposed from above; they should be drawn out of the institutions of labor
relations and shaped to their needs.
Id.
83. Cohen, supra note 78, at 558 ("Contractualism in the law . . . rests not only on the
will theory of contract but also on the political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the
government is best which governs least.").
84. Shulman, supra note 75, at 1005 ("To be sure, the parties are seeking to bind one
another and to define 'rights' and 'obligations' for the future.").
85. See id at 999.
[O]ur system of free enterprise and democratic government required the state,
subject to the limitations of public order, to permit workers to organize and to
extend their organization for the purpose of strengthening their bargaining
position in the struggle for a better share in return for their services. Their
shares were to be determined by the parties to the struggle, not by the state; and
the state should not interfere so as to make the struggle unequal.
Id.
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services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital,
to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on
the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is
the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be
carried on in a fair and equal way.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes (1896).86
Labor negotiations, or battles, as Holmes referred to them, are most
fairly waged when agreements are determined by the parties, not the
state. Both parties have great interest in making the enterprise thrive. 7
Labor agreements create "buy-ins" for employees who would usually be
shut out from the day-to-day decisions that most affect their working
environment and consequently their lives.8 8 When the state interferes so
as to make the power of one party greater than another, theg have
impermissibly interfered with the private law nature of contracts.
Florida courts generally recognize and uphold the private-law nature
of collectively bargained contracts between public employees and their
employers by disfavoring decisions that impede on the worker's right to
contract.90 This is consistent with the theory that too much public law
interference with private contract law is disfavored. 9 1
At the bargaining table, some public law is needed to bring
inherently unequal parties to relatively equal bargaining positions for
86. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Shulman, supra note 75, at 1005.
Both sides are interested in the welfare of the enterprise. Neither would
unashamedly seek contractual commitments that would destroy the other. Each
has conflicts of interests in its own ranks. Both might be content to leave the
future to discretion, if they had full confidence in that discretion and in its full
acceptance when exercised. And even when the negotiating representatives
have full confidence in each other as individuals, they recognize that it will be
many others, not they, who will play major roles in the administration of the
agreement.
Id.
88. Feller, supra note 81, at 724 ("Collective bargaining is not, then, the occasion for
introducing rules into the employment relationship. It is, rather, a method by which the
employees participate in what would otherwise be a system of unilateral management
rulemaking and administration.").
89. See generally Shulman, supra note 75.
90. See Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 672 (1993) (rejecting state's
position that public-employee bargaining agreements cannot ever fully constitute binding
contracts, even after they are accepted and funded); City of Miami Beach v. Bd. of Trs. of City
Pension Fund for Firefighters & Police Officers in Miami Beach, 91 So. 3d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA
2012)).
91. See supra note 75.
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the purpose of forming a labor agreement. Without being compelled, it
is doubtful that many, if any, employers would sit down and bargain
with employee representatives without the threat of great industrial
unrest. In Florida, the right to good faith bargaining is constitutionally
protected. Yet, a statute that dramatically undermines that protection
has been on the books for more than forty years. Workers who should
be able to create private law with their employers via labor contracts are
hampered at the bargaining table.
When a labor contract is formed, it is formed on agreement and
understanding that the commitment is binding, at least for a period of
time.93 That certainty for the future is a key feature of labor contracts
and of all contracts. 9 4 In Florida, no private-sector employer has the
authority conferred upon it by the legislature to selectively abrogate
collectively bargained contracts. Yet, Florida allows such abrogation
without showing cause by public employers.
The right of public employees to enter into and enforce collective
agreements95 will never be equal to the right of private-sector
employees. However, the inequality cannot be tipped so far as to
render the rights of one group-the public employees-null and void.
Therefore, action is required to restore the balance and rights, to public
sector employees by reducing unconstitutional public law interference
in private law contracting matters.
CONCLUSION

Undoing this wave of anti-worker animus will take either a massive
sea change in Tallahassee or a declaration by the Florida Supreme Court
that Chapter 447 and the Financial Urgency Statute are violative to the
letter and spirit of the Florida Constitution. Such intrusions by the state
on legally binding labor agreements have created a contractual caste
system where contracts bargained by public-sector workers and
individual public-sector workers are treated as more valid and
enforceable than contracts collectively bargained by private-sectors
workers via their union. Until balance is restored to the bargaining
92. See supra PartsI & II.
93. Feller, supra note 81, at 764 (Collective bargaining is accepted for a couple of
reasons but one that Feller mentions is: "a desire for certainty or stability with respect to labor
matters.").
94. Cohen, supra note 78, at 555 ("The development of contract is largely an incident of
commercial and industrial enterprises that involve a greater anticipation of the future than is
necessary in a simpler or more primitive economy.").
95. Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Sarasota Classified/Teachers Ass'n, 614 So. 2d 1143,
1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ("A public employee's constitutional right to bargain collectively is
not and cannot be coextensive with private employee's right to bargain collectively.").
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process and contracts are ensured as fully enforceable, the constitutional
right to bargain will remain a fiction for Florida's public employees.
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